A QBism/Enactivism dialogue

Science writer Amanda Gefter has organised a meeting between Christopher Fuchs (UMass, Boston), one of the founders of QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics, and Hanne De Jaegher and myself (Feb. 2023). Lots of resonances and complementarities, particularly regarding questions of agency, ontology, engaged epistemology, philosophy of probability, the universe in becoming, volleyball …


Two new online seminars and an interview (2021)

May 2021. Seminar given as part of the series on the Life and Work of Francisco Varela | Ouroboros Seminars 2021 | Varela 20/30. (19/05/2021).

May 2021. A talk in Spanish on “El concepto enactivo de agencia”, part of a seminar series called “Cultura material, agencia y prácticas” from the Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Argentina. (13/05/2021)

April 2021. An interview on the enactive mind by the Department of Education at PUC-Rio, Brazil.


Enactive sense of agency

A new open access paper discussing the enactive notion of sensorimotor agency and how it helps explain the phenomenology of the sense of agency in a non-representational manner.

Buhrmann, T., and Di Paolo, E. (2015) The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, doi: 10.1007/s11097-015-9446-7. (online first).

Abstract. The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency.

Keywords Enactive cognitive science. Agency. Sense of agency. Sensorimotor contingencies. Equilibration. Metastability